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FEDERAL PRoCBDURB-JurusnxcnoN-RBMovAL UNDER SEcnoN 1441(0)
oF TITLB 28 BY NoNRBSIDBNT DEFENDANT WBBRB JoINT ToaTs CAusB A

INJURY-Plaintiff, a citizeh of Utah, brought a joint action for damages
in a state court of Utah against Powell, also a citizen of Utah, and the Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff
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alleged both an assault and battery by Powell in the depot of the railroad company, and negligence of the railroad company in failing to take action to prevent or arrest this assault. The railroad company had the entire action removed
to the federal district court under section 144l(c) of the Judicial Code.1 Upon
motion of the railroad company, the claim against it was severed, and eventually
compromised and dismissed. Plaintiff then filed a motion to remand his remaining
action against Powell, which was denied. After judgment went for Powell,
plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals held, remanded with instructions to
vacate the judgment against Powell and remand this action to the state court.
Under section 144l(c) of the Judicial Code,2 no "separate and independent
claim or cause of action" existed as there was but a single injury for which relief
was sought. Snow 11. Powell, (10th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 172.
Section 144l(c) of the Judicial Code changed the requirements for removal
to the federal courts by nonresident defendants who were joined with defendants whose residence was in the same state as that of the plaintiff. One purpose
of this change was to clarify removal and free it from the "separable controversy"
doctrine existing under section 71 of the old Judicial Code.3 A second purpose
was to curtail the instances of removal by making the requirements more demanding.4 No longer was removal by a nonresident defendant only dependent
upon having a controversy with the plaintiff "which can be fully determined
as between them," 5 but under the present code defendant must show a "separate
and independent claim or cause of action" 6 against the plaintiff. The principal
case is in accord with this view. Clearly the facts present a "separable controversy" which would have been removable under section 71 of the old Judicial
Code.7 However, under section 144l(c), as interpreted by the United States
162 Stat. L. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §1441(c). It states in full:
''Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable
if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes
of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original
jurisdiction."
2 Jbid.
s See MooRE, CoMMBNTARY ON THB U.S. JUDICIAL CoDB §0.03(37), p. 239 (1949);
also Reviser's Notes, 28 U.S.C.A. 1441; American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S.
6, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951); Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d)
537.
4Jbid.
5The quoted language comes from 36 Stat. L. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C. (1946) §71.
The pertinent part of that section is: "And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can
be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually
interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United
States for the proper district."
6 See note 1 supra.
7 The principal case is very similar to Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 S.Ct.
347 (1939). In that case also there was a negligence action joined with an intentional
tort. The Court expressly found these claims to be "separable."
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Supreme Court in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 8 the action must be
remanded to the state court. The key words of section 144l(c), which are said
to indicate the more narrow approach to removal, are "separate and independent."
The emphasis placed on the word "independent" by the principal case coincides
with the emphasis placed on this word in the interpretation of this same section
by the Supreme Court in the Finn case.9 In attempting to shed light upon what
it would not consider "independent," the Supreme Court, in the Finn case,
indicated that where a "single wrongful invasion of a single primary right''10
was alleged, there could be no removal. In the principal case there has been
only one injury, and therefore only a "single wrongful invasion of a single
primary right." Accordingly, the action would not be "independent."11 In the
light of the Finn case, section 144l(c) must be interpreted as creating a narrower
area of removal jurisdiction. In the case where an action based on negligence
is joined with a willful tort, the change becomes most evident. It is unfortunate
that this matter must be subjected to a second trial on the merits. It has been
suggested that the Judicial Code be amended to allow an interlocutory appeal
from an order denying a motion to remand.12 This suggestion seems worthy of
repetition at this time.
Wilber M. Brucker, Jr., S.Ed.

s 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951).

e Ibid.
10 The full remarks of the Court explaining what it meant by a "single wrongful
invasion" are as follows: "single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintilf, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were
one or many, simple or complex."
11 Recent cases interpreting these same words are Bentley v. Halh"lrurton Oil Well
Cementing Co., (5th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 788; Edwards v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 165; Harward v. General Motors Corp., (D.C. N.C.
1950) 89 F. Supp. 170; Doran v. Elgin Cooperative Credit Assn., (D.C. Neb. 1950) 95
F. Supp. 455.
12 50 Mi:ca. L. Rsv. 475 at 477 (1952).

